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ABSTRACT 
The discovery of the petroleum resources in the Arctic waters and the rapid loss of sea ice raise concerns over 
environmental risks of oil development in the Arctic waters. One of the biggest threats to the marine 
environment from offshore oil production is a large-scale oil spill, akin to Deepwater Horizon. The challenging 
operating conditions, lack of infrastructure and effective clean-up techniques in the Arctic conditions exacerbate 
the need to ensure robust regulation of petroleum activities in the region. Whereas national laws vary 
extensively across the Arctic States, international law does not offer a uniform approach to prevention of and 
response to oil spills. This paper examines the scope and application of the relevant treaties and argues that a 
regulatory gap exists in the prevention of oil spills and addressing the challenges of response in Arctic 
conditions. It further suggests that there is an increasing role for soft-law regional cooperation in addressing 
these gaps. 
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In 2008, the United States Geological Survey discovered potentially vast petroleum resources 
in the Arctic waters.1 Despite the relatively low activity at present,2 a number of exploration 
licenses have been granted in all of the Arctic coastal States and it is expected that the 
production levels will increase with time, especially with the receding sea-ice and easier 
navigation through the Arctic shipping routes. 
It is generally agreed that petroleum development in Arctic waters is associated with elevated 
risks compared to more conventional locations. Potential oil spill recovery presents a bigger 
challenge due to the climatic conditions and the lack of infrastructure.3 In the Arctic, any 
response operation would have to be delayed by the time needed to gather assets and 
personnel. The environmental destruction caused by an oil spill could have more severe 
effects than in temperate climates due to the lower rate of oil biodegradation;4 if spilled, oil 
                                                 
1 Around 22% of the world’s undiscovered oil and gas resources, with about 85% occurring offshore. P Stauffer, 
‘US Geological Survey Circum-Arctic Resource Appraisal: Estimates of Undiscovered Oil and Gas North of the 
Arctic Circle’, available at http://library.arcticportal.org/1554/; accessed 29 June 2018. 
2 As of August 2018, there are only three producing fields in the Arctic waters: Prirazlomnoe (oil) in the Russian 
Arctic, and the Snøhvit (gas) and the Gøliat (oil) in Norway.  
3 DNV GL, Challenges and Best Practice of Oil Spill Response in the Arctic (DNV GL, Harstad, 2014) at p. 28; 
AO Kokorin, DV Karelin and AV Stetsenko (eds), The Impact of Climate Change on the Russian Arctic and 
Paths to Solving the Problem (WWF 2008) at p. 15, available at 
http://assets.panda.org/downloads/wwf_arctica_eng_1.pdf; accessed 6 November 2018.  
4 EPPR, Field Guide for Oil Spill Response in Arctic Waters (Environment Canada 1998), at pp. 5–68, available 
at https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/handle/11374/109; accessed 6 November 2018. 
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could persist in the Arctic environment for decades, as demonstrated by the lasting 
consequences of the 1989 Exxon Valdez spill.5 Oil from a spill at the end of the drilling 
season could get trapped in or under the ice and thus be impossible to clean up or even 
detect.6  The Arctic is home to over 4 million people, approximately 10% of whom are 
indigenous.7 The oil contamination of the coastal waters might bring devastating effects to 
the livelihoods of the communities that depend on their lands and waters for subsistence. 
To avoid catastrophic consequences, the Arctic States should establish an effective and 
coherent regulatory framework for the prevention of and response to oil spills, and the 
operators should be willing to conduct their activities under such an effective framework and 
with full cooperation. Although the national petroleum regulatory frameworks are quite 
disparate,8 the international legal framework does not offer a comprehensive treaty 
specifically regulating offshore petroleum development. The broader-in-scope UN 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOSC) consolidates international customary law on, inter 
alia, maritime delimitation, rights and duties of States in different maritime zones, and the 
                                                 
5 R Steiner, ‘Risks to Arctic Ecosystems’ (2010) 3 The Circle 13-16, at p.16.  
6 WWF, ‘Modeling Oil Spills in the Beaufort Sea Exploring the Risk: What Would Happen if Oil Spills in the 
Beaufort Sea?’ (2014), available at 
http://awsassets.wwf.ca/downloads/wwf_beaufort_sea_oil_spill_modelling_summary_report.pdf; accessed 6 
November 2018; JR Payne, GD McNabb and JR Clayton, ‘Oil Weathering Behavior in Arctic  Environments’  
7 G Fondahl, V Filippova and L Mack, ‘Indigenous Peoples in the New Arctic’ in B Evengård, JN Larsen and Ø 
Paasche (eds), The New Arctic (Springer, Cham, 2015) 7-22. 




protection and preservation of the marine environment.9 Furthermore, there are two 
multilateral treaties specifically relevant to oil spill response in the Arctic.10  
The Arctic Council, a high-level intergovernmental forum of the Arctic States, serves as a 
venue for cooperation and knowledge-generation on various issues, including offshore 
petroleum and environmental protection. The Council is usually described as a ‘soft law 
regime’,11 as it does not possess international legal personality and hence the power to take 
binding decisions. The work of the Council is carried out on three levels: ministerial, senior 
Arctic officials (SAOs) and the science-based groups: six Working Groups, Task Forces and 
Expert Groups. Its non-binding documents might provide complementary action to treaties 
and fill the lacunae when it comes to oil spill prevention and Arctic-specific response 
governance. The Council has also hosted the adoption of three binding agreements under its 
auspices in the recent years. 12  
                                                 
9 United Nations Convention on Law of the Sea (Montego Bay, 10 December 1982, in force 16 November 
1994) 1833 UNTS 396 (LOSC). 
10 International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and Co-operation (London, 30 November 
1990, in force 13 May 1995) 1891 UNTS 51 (OPRC); Agreement on Cooperation on Marine Oil Pollution, 
Preparedness and Response in the Arctic (Kiruna, 15 May 2013, in force 25 March 2016) available at 
https://arctic-council.org/eppr/agreement-on-cooperation-on-marine-oil-pollution-preparedness-and-response-in-
the-arctic/; accessed 29 June 2018 (MOSPA). Both are analysed in the third section. 
11 DR Rothwell, ‘Polar Opposites: Environmental Discourses and Management in Antarctica and the Arctic’ in 
B Jessup and K Rubenstein (eds), Environmental Discourses in Public and International Law (Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 2012) 355-374, at p.367. 
12 Agreement on Cooperation on Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue in the Arctic (Nuuk, 12 May 
2011, in force 19 January 2013) available at https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/handle/11374/531; accessed 6 
November 2018; MOSPA (n 10); Agreement on Enhancing International Arctic Scientific Cooperation 
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International and national legal regimes for offshore oil development in the Arctic have been 
the subject of a number of studies in the recent years,13 but the regulation of prevention and 
response to oil spills in the region have mostly been considered in general or from the 
national perspectives.14 Legal scholars highlighted the general lack of upstream oil spill 
prevention regulation in international law compared to response regulation and stringent 
prevention regulation in the international shipping sector.15 The questions of State 
responsibility for potential environmental damage from offshore petroleum activities in the 
Arctic have been examined in depth by Johnstone, who reviewed the applicability of general 
international law, treaties, and case law, and inter alia highlighted the potential difficulties in 
invoking State responsibility if the harm is inflicted on the areas beyond national 
                                                                                                                                                        
(Fairbanks, 11 May 2017, in force 23 May 2018) available at https://oaarchive.arctic-
council.org/handle/11374/1916; accessed 6 November 2018. 
13 RL Johnstone, Offshore Oil and Gas Development in the Arctic under International Law: Risk and 
Responsibility (Brill Nijhoff, Leiden, 2015); Pelaudeix and Basse (n 8); D Shapovalova and K Stephen, ‘No 
Race for the Arctic? Examination of Interconnections between Legal Regimes for Offshore Petroleum Licensing 
and Level of Industry Activity’ [2019 forthcoming] Energy Policy.  
14 See e.g., N Belkina and O Sarkova, ‘Regulatory Approaches to Oil Spill Response in Norway and Russia’ 
(2015) 38 Polar Geography 1-21; N Liu, ‘Protection of the Marine Environment from Offshore Oil and Gas 
Activities’ in R Rayfuse (ed), Research Handbook on International Marine Environmental Law (Edward Elgar, 
Cheltenham, 2015) 190-205. Liability regimes for oil spills are examined in Johnstone (n 13); K Svendsen, 
Compensable Damage Ex Delicto of Harm in the Barents Sea Caused by Petroleum Spills from Offshore 
Installations (PhD Thesis, University of Tromsø, 2015). 
15 R Dopplick, ‘Multilateral Regional Oil Spill Preparedness and Response Agreements: Lessons for the Arctic’ 
(2012) 10 OGEL 1-92; C Redgwell, ‘Mind the Gap in the GAIRS: The Role of Other Instruments in LOSC 
Regime Implementation in the Offshore Energy Sector’ (2014) 29 The International Journal of Marine and 
Coastal Law 600-621, at p. 619. 
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jurisdiction.16 Finally, the important role of the Arctic Council soft-law documents in the 
prevention of and response to oil spills in the Arctic has been examined.17 This paper builds 
on these contributions by analysing treaties relevant to oil spill prevention and response in the 
Arctic in light of their scope and application. It argues that the treaty regulation of the 
offshore petroleum activities in the Arctic leaves gaps in the prevention of oil spills and well 
control while focusing on international cooperation in response operations. It further suggests 
that the Arctic Council governance of oil spills through non-binding norms and facilitating 
cooperation between regulatory agencies and non-State actors could be instrumental in 
improving offshore safety in the region. To this end, the next section outlines the meaning of 
prevention and response oil spills and specific Arctic challenges, and the third section 
analyses the regulatory scope of the relevant treaties. The fourth section then analyses the 
Arctic Council actions in governing oil spill prevention and response in the region and 
suggests that it could prove a useful regulatory tool, especially with the lack of binding 
international obligations. 
 
Defining oil spills, prevention, and response in the Arctic  
Large-scale marine oil spills can result from oil tanker accidents and offshore petroleum 
activities. This paper focuses on the latter and this section clarifies the scope by examining 
                                                 
16 Johnstone (n 13), in particular at pp. 189-267; Johnstone, ‘Invoking Responsibility For Environmental Injury 
in the Arctic Ocean’ (2014) 6(1) Yearbook of Polar Law 1-35; See also, M Byers, International Law and the 
Arctic (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2014) at pp. 209–212. 
17 HM Osofsky, JM Shadian and SL Fechtelkotter, ‘Preventing and Responding to Arctic Offshore Drilling 
Disasters: The Role of Hybrid Cooperation’ in J Peel and E Fisher (eds), The Role of International 
Environmental Law in Disaster Risk Reduction (Brill Nijhoff, Leiden, 2016) 392-419. 
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the meaning and challenges of prevention, preparedness and response to oil spills from 
offshore petroleum development in the Arctic. This differentiation is imperative for the 
further examination of the regulation in sections 3 and 4.  
The main three sources of oil spills from offshore petroleum production are the loss of well 
control, platform failure, and operational discharges.18 The operational discharges from 
routine operations, such as drill cuttings, might have damaging cumulative effects and are 
regulated at the national and regional level.19 However, the biggest risk to the marine 
environment is arguably posed by a possible large-scale oil spill in the Arctic waters, 
resulting from a loss of well control.20 Such accidental spills are the focus of this paper. 
Loss of well control (such as a well blowout) occurs when ‘formation pressure exceeds the 
pressure applied to it by the drilling column of drilling fluid’.21 A blowout can be caused by a 
pocket of oil under high pressure, human error, a technical failure, or a combination of all of 
the above.22 Well blowouts are responsible for the two biggest known oil spills resulting from 
                                                 
18 JG Speight, Handbook of Offshore Oil and Gas Operations (Elsevier, Waltham/Oxford, 2015) at pp. 257–
303.  
19 M Knol, ‘The Uncertainties of Precaution: Zero Discharges in the Barents Sea’ (2011) 35 Marine Policy 399-
404; SV Vinogradov and JP Wagner ‘International Legal Regime for the Protection of the Marine Environment 
Against Operational Pollution from Offshore Petroleum Activities’ in Z Gao (ed), Environmental Regulation of 
Oil and Gas (Kluwer, London, 1998) 93-143.  
20 R O’Rourke, ‘Changes in the Arctic: Background and Issues for Congress’ (Congressional Research Service 
2014) at p. 30; AMAP, ‘Arctic Oil and Gas 2007’ (2007) at pp. 24–25. 
21 Speight (n 18) at p. 402. 
22., at p. 275. 
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offshore petroleum development activities - Deepwater Horizon and Ixtoc 1.23 Closer to the 
Arctic, the Ekofisk Bravo blowout in 1977 resulted in 80,000 to 126,000 barrels of oil spilled 
into the Norwegian waters.24  
Platform failures relate to incidents occurring on the platform itself that can lead to a fire, 
explosion, and subsequent loss of well control. One example is the 1988 Piper Alpha disaster 
on the UK continental shelf leading to the explosion that took 167 lives.25 The enquiry 
following the incident found that the operator was not adequately prepared for an emergency 
and the regulator was criticised for carrying out ‘superficial’ inspections and not assessing the 
management of safety.26  
Most measures directed at minimising the risk to human health and environment can be 
divided into prevention of, preparedness for, and response to oil spills.  Prevention measures 
are designed to avoid the incident before it happens and response operations are aimed at 
containing the spill, recovering as much oil as possible. Measures aimed at controlling the 
                                                 
23 T Hunter, ‘Offshore Oil Spill Contingency Planning and Response: The International Legal Regime’ 
(forthcoming, on file with author). 
24 EU Offshore Authorities Group, ‘Landmark Incidents’ available at http://euoag.jrc.ec.europa.eu/node/41; 
accessed 29 June 2018. 
25 J Paterson, ‘Health and Safety at Work Offshore’ in G Gordon, J Paterson and E Üşenmez (eds), Oil and Gas 
Law: Current Practice and Emerging Trends (2nd ed, Dundee University Press, Dundee, 2011) 187-230, at p. 
204. 
26 The Hon Lord Cullen, ‘The Public Inquiry into the Piper Alpha Disaster (Vol 1)’ (Department of Energy 
1993) at pp. 238, 253, available at http://www.hse.gov.uk/offshore/piper-alpha-public-inquiry-volume1.pdf; 
accessed 6 November 2018. 
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source of the spill may be classified in both the prevention and response categories,27 but will 
be treated as prevention measures for the purposes of this paper.28  
The Emergency Prevention, Preparedness and Response Working Group of the Arctic 
Council (EPPR) defines prevention systems as ‘prescriptive hardware requirements for safe 
operations, [and] implementation of robust management systems with regulatory 
accountability criteria, etc’.29 Thus, all prevention measures could be generally divided into 
two groups: requirements for materials and processes in the construction and operation of a 
well, including safety management systems. Well standards are requirements for the 
materials and practices used in the construction and operation of the well, such as the 
requirements for the steel and cement, cement evaluation tool (cement bond log), and the 
blowout preventers (BOPs).30 The Arctic conditions warrant additional prevention 
requirements as they might compromise the performance of certain materials and processes. 
                                                 
27 Dopplick (n 15) at p. 8. 
28
 The Arctic Council followed a similar distinction. EPPR, ‘Overview of Measures Specifically Designed to 
Prevent Oil Pollution in the Arctic Marine Environment from Offshore Petroleum Activities’ (2017) available at 
https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/handle/11374/1962; accessed 6 November 2018, focuses on drilling and well 
technologies and spill containment, and specifically excludes response measures; the MOSPA (n 10) focuses on 
cooperation in clean-up operations and oil spill preparedness plans. 
29 EPPR, ‘Recommended Practices for Arctic Oil Spill Prevention’ (2013) at p. 12, available at 
https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/handle/11374/614; accessed 6 November 2018. 
30 BOPs come in a variety of styles, but the basic principle is that they act as a valve or set of valves on top of 




For example, the cement might freeze before establishing sufficient compressive strength;31 
the use of high-quality low-temperature suitable steel might be required. 32  
The safety management systems (SMS) are a crucial element of oil spill prevention. The 
analyses of Deepwater Horizon and the Montara blowouts identified failures in the SMS or 
‘safety culture’33 of the operators.34 The SMS vary between operators, but all contain basic 
elements such as hazard analysis, training, investigation of incidents, auditing, reporting, and 
safe work practices.35 Arctic conditions warrant additional requirements to be adopted for the 
training of personnel working in extreme weather conditions and limited/extensive daylight, 
establishing shorter working shifts.36  
                                                 
31 Pew Charitable Trusts, ‘Arctic Standards: Recommendations on Oil Spill Prevention, Response, and Safety in 
the U.S. Arctic Ocean’ (2013) at p. 82, available at https://www.pewtrusts.org/-
/media/assets/2013/09/23/arcticstandardsfinal.pdf; accessed 6 November 2018. 
32 Ibid., at p. 61. 
33 Safety culture is described as ‘attitudes, values and behaviours shared within (and across) a company or 
organisation aimed at minimising risk and maximising safety’. PAME, ‘Systems Safety Management and Safety 
Culture: Avoiding Major Disasters in Arctic Offshore Oil and Gas Operations’ (2014) at pp. 16–17, available at 
https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/handle/11374/418; accessed 6 November 2018. 
34 National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling, ‘Deep Water: The Gulf 
Oil Disaster and the Future of Offshore Drilling: Report to the President’ (2011) at pp. 223–224, available at 
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-OILCOMMISSION/pdf/GPO-OILCOMMISSION.pdf; accessed 6 
November 2018; ‘Report of the Montara Commission of Inquiry’ (2010) at pp. 343–350, available at 
http://www.iadc.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/201011-Montara-Report.pdf; accessed 6 November 2018. 
35 IS Sutton, Offshore Safety Management (2nd ed, Elsevier, Waltham/Oxford, 2014) table 1.2. 
36 PAME (n 33). 
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The analyses of the previous blowouts37 demonstrate that failures at the prevention stage 
were among the root causes of the incidents. Arguably, much of the regulators’ attention 
should be devoted to tailoring existing well standards and management systems to the Arctic 
conditions. 
After a blowout, the priority is to regain control of the well as soon as possible to stop the 
flow of hydrocarbons. However, during the past blowouts it took months to cap the wells.38 
Thus, well control plans should be in place to identify site-specific source control methods. 
If the blowout occurs, external equipment, such as capping stacks and containment domes, 
can be used to stop or divert the hydrocarbon release. The requirements for such well control 
equipment (including availability and location) are usually determined by the national 
authorities. Thus, Norwegian and US legislation requires all operators to have the necessary 
contingency plans and agreements with suppliers in place to be able to deploy capping stacks 
for Arctic drilling.39 In the Arctic conditions, the deployment of such equipment on site is 
more challenging due to the lack of natural light, low temperatures, and strong winds, as well 
as the lack of infrastructure capabilities.40 Furthermore, the use of well control equipment 
also requires taking into to account subsurface conditions such as permafrost and the 
                                                 
37 National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon (n 34); ‘Report of the Montara Commission of Inquiry’ 
(n 34) at pp. 343–75; The Hon Lord Cullen (n 26). 
38 Over two months for Montara, over five months for Deepwater Horizon. Hunter (n 23). 
39 Norway: Petroleum Safety Authority Norway, Regulations Relating to Conducting Petroleum Activities sec 
86; US: 30 CFR §250.471. 
40 DNV GL (n 3) at p. 28; Kokorin et al., (n 3) at p. 15.  
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presence of offshore methane hydrates.41 This external equipment is used to restore well 
control, but is considered a temporary fix until the well can be permanently controlled.42 
To permanently kill the incident well a relief well is required to be drilled to stabilise the 
pressure.43 In the Arctic, one of the biggest concerns is an end-of-season blowout, which 
would require response operations to be conducted in the presence of autumn and winter ice. 
For this reason, the requirement of a same-season relief well (SSRW) is instituted in some 
jurisdictions, including Canada,44 Norway,45 and Greenland.46 The requirement entails the 
operators having to demonstrate the capability to drill a relief well during the same drilling 
season, which might increase costs for the operator as a separate rig is needed on stand-by.  
If the incident occurred and oil entered the marine environment, the operators and the State 
response systems must be prepared to contain the spill promptly and recover as much oil as 
possible. Response plans typically list the plan of response actions, equipment needed and 
                                                 
41 Pew Charitable Trusts (n 31) at p. 35. 
42 Wood Group Kenny, ‘Subsea Capping Stack Technology Requirements’ (2016) at pp. 27–28, available at 
https://www.bsee.gov/sites/bsee.gov/files/tap-technical-assessment-program/756aa.pdf; accessed 6 November 
2018. 
43 Ibid. at p. 43. 
44 Canadian National Energy Board retains the right to consider other options if they achieve the goal to ‘kill an 
out-of-control well during the same drilling season.’ Canada National Energy Board, ‘The Past Is Always 
Present: Review of Offshore Drilling in the Canadian Arctic’ (2011) at p. 39, available at https://www.neb-
one.gc.ca/nrth/rctcffshrdrllngrvw/2011fnlrprt/2011fnlrprt-eng.pdf; accessed 6 November 2018. 
45 ‘NORSOK Standard D-010 Well Integrity in Drilling and Well Operations’ sec 4.8.2 available at 
http://www.standard.no/pagefiles/1315/d-010r3.pdf; accessed 29 June 2018. 
46 ‘Greenland Bureau of Minerals and Petroleum Drilling Guidelines’ (2011) available at 
https://www.govmin.gl/images/stories/petroleum/110502_Drilling_Guidelines.pdf; accessed 29 June 2018. 
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techniques used to recover and contain an oil spill. Such plans need to be site-specific and be 
subject to rigorous oversight from the regulator. The Deepwater Horizon inquiry found that 
the response plan was in parts copied from other materials, ‘without any discernible effort to 
determine the applicability of that information to the Gulf of Mexico’.47 In the Arctic 
conditions, the response operations might be challenging due to the short duration of the ice-
free seasons, lack of infrastructure, and lack of proven methods of oil spill clean-up in the 
Arctic conditions.48  
An effective response requires coordination between the industry and the local authorities. 
Exercises, including international ones, are essential to ensure that such cooperation and 
communication methods, including immigration and customs regulations, are effective. One 
of the issues revealed by the Deepwater Horizon investigation was the rejection of some 
international offers of assistance due to legislation in place preventing foreign vessels from 
participating in trade between US ports.49 
Generally, the effectiveness rates of spilled oil recovery are low: only about 25% of oil 
spilled during the Deepwater Horizon blowout was recovered, burned or skimmed during the 
response operations.50 Recovering oil from the water in the Arctic conditions presents 
                                                 
47 National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon (n 34) at p. 84. 
48 Response to oil spills in the Arctic is the subject of numerous studies and research projects. See e.g. EPPR, 
‘Circumpolar Oil Spill Response Viability Analysis: Technical Report’ (2017), available at 
https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/handle/11374/1928; accessed 6 November 2018.; EPPR, ‘Guide to Oil Spill 
Response in Snow and Ice Conditions’ (2015). See also APP4SEA – Arctic Preparedness Platform for Oil Spill 
and Other Environmental Accidents (http://app4sea.interreg-npa.eu/about-the-project/; accessed 29 June 2018). 
49 National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon (n 34) at pp. 142–143. 
50 Ibid., at p.168. 
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additional challenges. The main techniques for the recovery of oil offshore are: mechanical 
recovery, in situ burning, and using dispersants. Mechanical recovery in the Arctic can be 
limited by weather conditions and ice presence, which all affect the functioning of response 
vessels, equipment, and personnel.51 In situ burning is viewed as ‘especially suited when oil 
is spilled in an environment with the presence of ice’;52 however, using it creates additional 
risks to life from secondary fires53 and environmental effects from smoke and soot.  The use 
of dispersants may be effective if applied soon after the spill,54 but may be hampered by the 
absence of a streamlined pre-approval process in the Arctic States and the potential effects on 
wildlife and the fisheries industry.55 
As demonstrated, both prevention and response measures in the Arctic present additional 
challenges and warrant additional regulatory attention. Due to the difficulties in response and 
to minimise the risk to human health and environment, prevention of oil spills should be 
addressed effectively by regional and international regulation. The next section examines the 
ways in which treaties regulate oil spill prevention, preparedness and response in the Arctic. 
 
                                                 
51 S Potter et al., Spill Response in the Arctic Offshore (American Petroleum Institute and the Joint Industry 
Programme on Oil Spill Recovery in Ice, 2012) at p. 92, available at http://www.dfdickins.com/pdf/Spill-
Response-in-the-Arctic-Offshore.pdf; accessed 6 November 2018. 
52 Ibid., at p. 33. 
53 Ibid., at p. 34. 
54 A Lewis and PS Daling, A Review of Studies of Oil Spill Dispersant Effectiveness in Arctic Conditions (Sintef, 
2007) at p. 19, available at 
https://www.sintef.no/globalassets/project/jip_oil_in_ice/dokumenter/publications/jip-rep-no-11-dispersant-
effectiveness-in-arctic-conditions-150207.pdf; accessed 6 November 2018. 
55 EPPR (2015) (n 48) at pp. 19, 29, 103. 
15 
 
 Treaty regulation of Arctic oil spill prevention, preparedness, and response  
Offshore upstream petroleum development is not comprehensively regulated by treaties at the 
global level.56 Although there are some regional legal developments in place,57 the Arctic 
region remains under fragmented regulation. The adoption of an ‘Arctic Treaty’ has long 
been on the political and research agenda,58 but in its absence the following agreements are 
the most relevant to the prevention and response to oil spills in the Arctic: the OPRC59 and 
MOSPA,60 and the LOSC. Furthermore, the OSPAR61 and the MARPOL62 are of relevance to 
                                                 
56 See L Chabason, Offshore Oil Exploitation: A New Frontier for International Environmental Law (Institute 
for Sustainable Development and International Relations, 2011), available at 
https://www.iddri.org/sites/default/files/import/publications/wp-1111_chabason_offshore.pdf; accessed 6 
November 2018. See also Liu for the comprehensive review of existing international rules (n 14). 
57 E.g., the European Union Directive 2013/30/EU on Safety of Offshore Oil and Gas Operations and Amending 
Directive 2004/35/EC [2013] OJ L178/66. 
58 T Koivurova and EJ Molenaar, International Governance and Regulation of the Marine Arctic (WWF, 2010), 
available at http://assets.panda.org/downloads/3in1_final.pdf; accessed 6 November 2018; European Parliament 
Resolution of 9 October 2008 on Arctic Governance, available at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P6-TA-2008-
0474+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN; accessed 6 November 2018; DR Rothwell; MA Verhaag, ‘It Is Not Too Late: 
The Need for a Comprehensive International Treaty to Protect the Arctic Environment’ (2002) 15 Georgetown 
International Environmental Law Review 555-579. 
59 OPRC (n 10). 
60 MOSPA (n 10). 
61 Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North-East Atlantic (Paris, 22 September 
1992, in force 25 March 1998) 2354 UNTS 67 (OSPAR). 
62 International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (London, 17 February 1973, in force 2 
October 1983) (1973) 12 ILM 1319 (MARPOL). 
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the protection of the marine environment in general, but as demonstrated in this section, are 
of limited application to the prevention of and response to oil spills.  
 
 International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and Co-operation 
(OPRC) and the Agreement on Cooperation on Marine Oil Pollution, Preparedness and 
Response in the Arctic (MOSPA)  
The OPRC is currently ratified by all five Arctic coastal States.63 It was adopted under the 
framework of the International Maritime Organization (IMO) with the objectives to ‘promote 
international cooperation and to enhance existing national, regional and global capabilities 
concerning oil pollution preparedness and response (…)’.64 
The scope of the OPRC relates to incidental pollution, from both ships and offshore oil 
installations.65 However, obligations in the OPRC are mostly related to the cooperation in 
response operations after the oil spill occurs rather than preventive measures. It does not set 
requirements for the design of the well, pipelines, installations, or safety culture. 
With regard to the offshore installations, the OPRC requires that they have an emergency 
plan coordinated with the national system and approved by the relevant authority.66 The 
OPRC further requires that all the States establish a ‘national system for responding promptly 
                                                 
63 IMO, Status of Multilateral Conventions as of 14 March 2017, available at 
http://www.imo.org/en/About/Conventions/StatusOfConventions/Pages/Default.aspx; accessed 6 November 
2018.  
64 OPRC (n 10) preamble. 
65 Ibid., Art. 2. 
66 Ibid., Art. 3(2). 
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and effectively to oil pollution incidents’.67 It sets minimum content requirements for such 
systems, such as the competent authority responsible for oil pollution preparedness and 
response; the operational contact point for the receipt and transmission of oil pollution 
reports; and an authority entitled to act on behalf of the State to request assistance or to 
decide to render the assistance requested.68 
Additionally, the OPRC requires that each Party, ‘within its capabilities’ and ‘as appropriate’, 
establish: a minimum level of prepositioned oil spill combatting equipment, a programme for 
exercises and training, detailed plans and communication capabilities for responding, and a 
relevant coordination mechanism.69 Although the requirement to have such equipment 
available is written into the legislation of the Arctic States examined here,70 the proximity of 
such equipment to drilling sites, its transportation to the site in bad weather conditions, and 
its effectiveness in responding to large-scale oil spills in the Arctic are questionable. For 
example, in the US, the nearest Coast Guard base to the Arctic coast is in Kodiak, Alaska, 
about 900 miles away.71 The proximity and availability of response equipment and personnel 
in the coastal settlements is also a concern in the Canadian Arctic.72 
                                                 
67 Ibid., Art. 6(1). 
68 Ibid. 
69 Ibid.,  Art. 6 (2). 
70 See e.g., Russian Government Decree no. 1189 ‘On the Organisation of Prevention and Liquidation of Oil 
Spills on the Continental Shelf of the Russian Federation, in the Internal Waters and the Territorial Sea’ (14 
November 2014) 47 Sobranie Zakonodael’stva Rossiiskoi Federatsii 6549. US: US Arctic OCS Final Rule, ‘Oil 
and Gas and Sulfur Operations on the Outer Continental Shelf—Requirements for Exploratory Drilling on the 
Arctic Outer Continental Shelf’ (81 FR 46478 2016). 
71 Pew Environmental Group, ‘Oil Spill Prevention and Response in the U.S. Arctic Region: Unexamined Risks, 
Unacceptable Consequences’ (2010) at p. 22, available at 
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In relation to international cooperation, the OPRC requires reporting any incidents affecting 
or likely to affect another State.73 It further stipulates that States ‘subject to their capability 
and availability of the relevant resources’ shall cooperate and provide advisory services, 
technical support and equipment for the purposes of oil spill response, if the severity so 
justifies.74  
The Arctic coastal States comply with the main provisions of the OPRC. Legislation in all 
five States requires each offshore petroleum development unit to have an emergency plan.75 
                                                                                                                                                        
https://www.pewtrusts.org/~/media/legacy/oceans_north_legacy/page_attachments/oil-spill-prevention.pdf; 
accessed 6 November 2018. The issue of equipment availability and deployment is addressed in the US Arctic 
OCS Drilling Rule (n 70). 
72 WWF, ‘Oil Spill Response Capacity in Nunavut and the Beaufort Sea’ (2017) at pp. 3–4, available at 
http://awsassets.wwf.ca/downloads/170405___oilspillresponsecapacitynunavut_web.pdf?_ga=1.229131932.182
9272820.1475691822, accessed 6 November 2018 . 
73 OPRC (n 10) Art. 5(1). If the severity of the incident justifies so, the States shall also report such incidents to 
the IMO directly, Art. 5(3). 
74 Ibid., Art. 7(1). 
75 Canada: Oil and Gas Drilling and Production Regulations SOR/2009-315 sec 6(j). Greenland: ‘Mineral 
Licence and Safety Authority Guidelines for Application, Execution and Reporting of Offshore Hydrocarbon 
Exploration Activities (Excluding Drilling) in Greenland’ (2016), available at 
https://naalakkersuisut.gl//~/media/Nanoq/Files/Publications/Raastof/ENG/UK%20MLSA%20Guidelines%202
016.pdf accessed 6 November 2018. Norway: Act no 6 Concerning Protection against Pollution and Concerning 
Waste (13 March 1981) (Pollution Act) sec 40. Russia: Government Decree no 1189 ‘On the Organisation of 
Prevention and Liquidation of Oil Spills on the Continental Shelf of the Russian Federation, in the Internal 
Waters and the Territorial Sea’ (14 November 2014) 47 Sobranie Zakonodael’stva Rossiiskoi Federatsii 6549. 
US: 30 CRF § 254.5. Additional requirements for Arctic operations, e.g., consideration of ‘human factors, (…) 
associated with oil spill response activities in adverse weather conditions and their impacts on decision-making 
and health and safety’. 30 CRF § 254.70.  
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National emergency response systems, consistent with the OPRC requirements, are also 
present in the Arctic States’ regulations.76 
However, for the purposes of prevention of and response to oil spills in the Arctic, the OPRC 
requirements might be too broad and insufficient. They leave out preventive measures and do 
not address Arctic-specific challenges in response, such as the climatic conditions and the 
lack of infrastructure. This is understandable, given that addressing regional specificities is 
outside the scope of the OPRC. Instead, the OPRC promotes the conclusion of further 
‘bilateral and multilateral agreements for oil pollution preparedness and response’.77 It is in 
accordance with this provision that the MOSPA78 was adopted by the eight Arctic States, 
                                                 
76 Canada: Coast Guard prepares and maintains an emergency management plan. Canada Emergency 
Management Act SC 2007 c 15 sec 6(1). Greenland: under sec 80 of the Greenland Mineral Resources Act, the 
Mineral License and Safety Authority develops an ‘Emergency Management Programme for Hydrocarbon 
Activities in Greenland’, available at 
https://www.govmin.gl/images/stories/faelles/mineral_resources_act_unofficial_translation.pdf; accessed 6 
November 2018. Norway: State and separate municipalities must have contingency plans for response to acute 
pollution. Pollution Act sec 43-4. Russia: Government Decree no 794 establishes the ‘Unified State Emergency 
Preparedness and Response System’ and tasks the Ministry of Transport to organise response system for oil 
spills, 2 Sobranie Zakonodael’stva Rossiiskoi Federatsii 121; US: The National Oil and Hazardous Substances 
Pollution Contingency Plan establishes the national response team, regional response teams, and outlines 
coordination between local, state, federal and private response agencies, available at 
https://www.epa.gov/emergency-response/national-oil-and-hazardous-substances-pollution-contingency-plan-
ncp-overview; accessed 6 November 2018.  
77 OPRC (n 10) Art.  10. 
78 MOSPA (n 10). 
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under the auspices of the Arctic Council. The Agreement was negotiated ‘in a highly 
collaborative spirit’79 and adopted within a short two-year period. 
The decision to negotiate the Agreement was based on the report of the Senior Arctic 
Officials (SAOs), which raised concerns over the Deepwater Horizon blowout and the 
absence of the Arctic region-specific ‘marine oil pollution response instrument’.80 
Despite being an Arctic-specific treaty, the MOSPA does little to address the prevention of 
oil spills or the response challenges discussed in the second section. The main body of the 
Agreement is supplemented by non-binding Operational Guidelines outlining the relevant 
details for any potential joint response operations. The Agreement’s provisions mainly mirror 
the obligations under the OPRC and do not attempt to address the Arctic specifically. Thus, it 
almost verbatim repeats the OPRC’s requirements for equipment and exercise, 
communication plans, and coordination mechanism.81 It further repeats the requirements for 
the national response system,82 incident notification,83 assistance requests and movement of 
resources across borders.84 Finally, the MOSPA similarly conditions the implementation of 
the majority of the Agreement’s provisions on ‘capabilities of the Parties and the availability 
                                                 
79 Senior Arctic Officials (SAO) Report to Ministers (Kiruna, May 2013) at p. 32, available at 
https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/handle/11374/848; accessed 6 November 2018. 
80 Senior Arctic Officials (SAO) Report to Ministers (Nuuk, May 2011) at p. 6, available at 
https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/handle/11374/1535; accessed 6 November 2018. 
81 MOSPA (n 10) Art.  4(2), OPRC (n 10) Art.  6(2). 
82 MOSPA Art.  5, OPRC Art.  6(1)(a). 
83 MOSPA Art.  6, OPRC Art.  5. 
84 MOSPA Arts.  8 and 9, OPRC Art.  7. 
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of relevant resources’85 and provides for the reimbursement of the incurred costs by the 
requesting party.86  
The MOSPA does have some added value to Arctic oil spill response. First, it extends the 
geographical scope to the areas beyond national jurisdiction for the provisions related to 
monitoring, notification, and the request and provision of assistance.87 This is significant 
considering the lack of protections available for such areas in general international law. 
Second, the MOSPA is associated with the Arctic Council’s institutional capacity to monitor 
the implementation. Finally, it institutes some new obligations,88 and contains non-binding 
Operational Guidelines. It should be noted, though, that the new provisions often use ‘soft’ 
language, such as ‘to the extent feasible’ (Art. 7.1), ‘should’, ‘where appropriate’ (Art.. 11), 
and ‘should endeavour’ (Art. 12), thus potentially limiting the enforceability of these 
requirements.89 
The joint exercises and training were mentioned in the OPRC, but only with regard to the 
Parties which request the assistance and ‘as appropriate’.90 The MOSPA uses stronger 
language by stating that the Parties ‘shall promote cooperation and coordination by 
endeavouring to carry out joint exercises and training, including alerting or call-out exercises, 
                                                 
85 MOSPA Art.  15, OPRC 7(1). 
86 MOSPA Art.  10, OPRC annex. 
87 MOSPA Art.  3.2.  
88 Ibid., Art.  7 requires monitoring; Art.  11 requires review of any joint operations. Art.  12 requires the 
promotion of the ‘cooperation and exchange of information that may serve to improve the effectiveness of oil 
pollution preparedness and response operations’. 
89 P Weil, ‘Towards Relative Normativity in International Law?’ (1983) 77(3) American Journal of 
International Law 413-442, at pp. 414-415. 
90 OPRC (n 10) Art.  9(1). 
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table-top exercises, equipment deployment exercises, and other relevant activities’.91 It 
further encourages States to design the exercises so as to ‘incorporate lessons learned’92 and 
‘include stakeholders in the planning and execution’.93 The MOSPA provision on joint 
exercises has been implemented even before the Agreement came into force. The first table-
top exercise, including all eight Arctic States and 31 distinct agencies, was hosted by Canada 
in May-June 2014.94 Since then similar exercises have regularly been conducted around the 
Arctic, with the latest round taking place in March 2018 in Finland.95  
The MOSPA establishes regular meetings to review the implementation and notes that Arctic 
Council can be used as a forum for discussions regarding the operational issues related to the 
implementation.96 The relevant Working Group of the Arctic Council (EPPR) meets twice a 
year and has established a task force that is specifically tasked with the implementation of the 
MOSPA.97 
                                                 
91 MOSPA (n 10) Art.  13.1. 
92 Ibid., Art.  13.2. 
93 Ibid., Art.  13.3. 
94 Arctic Council, ‘Arctic Exercise: After Action Report’ (2014) available at https://oaarchive.arctic-
council.org/bitstream/handle/11374/404/ACMMCA09_Iqaluit_2015_EPPR_Fisheries_and_Oceans-
After_Actions_Report.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y; accessed 29 June 2018. 
95 Arctic Council, ‘EPPR Table-Top Exercise on Oil Spill Response in the Arctic’ (5 March 2018) available at 
https://www.arctic-council.org/index.php/en/our-work2/8-news-and-events/484-mospa-ttx-2018; accessed 23 
May 2018. 
96 MOSPA (n 10) Art.  14.2. 
97 Arctic Council Marine Environmental Response Experts Group Mandate (29 June 2017) available at 
https://oaarchive.arctic-
council.org/bitstream/handle/11374/2107/MER_EG_Mandate_Final_Signed.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y; 
accessed 25 June 2018. 
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The Operational Guidelines are included as an Appendix to the Agreement and are explicitly 
non-binding.98 They include forms for request for and provision of assistance and 
communication (section 11), and information on the national organisation of the response 
system for each of the Arctic States (section 12). The EPPR adopted the revision procedure to 
keep the Guidelines up to date.99  
The Guidelines specify the content of general obligations contained in the body of the 
Agreement. To that end, they provide recommendations and highlight best practices. For 
example, sections 1 and 2 specify the detailed content of a notification of an incident, and the 
request for assistance. Section 3 considers the implementation issues for the movement and 
removal of resources associated with customs and immigration. They provide a timeline for 
cooperation during an oil pollution incident and distribute roles and responsibilities between 
the requesting and the assisting parties.  
Thus, although the MOSPA builds on the OPRC by introducing some new obligations, 
extending the scope, and using the Arctic Council's capacity for implementation and updating 
the Operational Guidelines, it still does little to address the prevention of oil spills. 
 
                                                 
98 MOSPA (n 10) Art.  21.1. 
99 EPPR, Procedures for Updating the Operating Guidelines (2013) available at https://oaarchive.arctic-
council.org/handle/11374/1260; accessed 29 June 2018. 
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 Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North-East Atlantic 
(OSPAR) and International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships 
(MARPOL)  
Two further international agreements appear, at the outset, to be instrumental for prevention 
of and response to oil spills in the Arctic. The OSPAR is aimed at the protection of the North-
East Atlantic waters, and the MARPOL is the global treaty on prevention of pollution from 
ships. Both treaties’ relevance to oil spills in the Arctic is analysed below. 
The OSPAR’s geographical scope extends to parts of the Arctic waters.100 The OSPAR 
establishes the OSPAR Commission, which supervises implementation, reviews the condition 
of the maritime area, and evaluates the effectiveness of the adopted measures.101 The OSPAR 
is supplemented by the Annexes; Annex III regulates the ‘Prevention and Elimination of 
Pollution from Offshore Sources’ and primarily deals with dumping102 and decommissioning 
of the offshore petroleum installations and pipelines.103 Because ‘dumping’ relates to 
deliberate disposal,104 this incidental pollution is not covered by the Annexes’ provisions. 
Thus, although the geographical scope of the OSPAR warrants its examination for the 
purposes of Arctic petroleum development, the main text of the OSPAR and its relevant 
Annex do not address oil spill prevention and response specifically. 
                                                 
100 Waters between Norway and Denmark, see the map at https://www.ospar.org/convention/the-north-east-
atlantic; accessed 29 June 2018 
101 OSPAR (n 61) Art.  10. 
102 Ibid., Annex III Art.  3. 
103 Ibid., Annex III Art.  5, 6-8. 
104 OSPAR (n 61) Art.  1(f). 
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The consideration of oil spills, however, is present in the activities of the OSPAR 
Commission. In response to the Deepwater Horizon blowout,105 it adopted Recommendation 
2010/18 on the prevention of significant acute oil pollution from offshore drilling 
activities.106 The Recommendation required States to continue or urgently start reviewing 
‘existing frameworks including the permitting of drilling in extreme conditions’.107  
The MARPOL is the main international legal instrument regulating operational and incidental 
pollution from ships, including ‘fixed or floating platforms’.108 Although the MARPOL 
appears to be relevant to the regulation of Arctic oil spill prevention and response due to its 
scope, this paper submits that it is of limited application.109 The term ‘discharge’, under the 
MARPOL’s definition, does not include substances ‘directly arising from the exploration, 
exploitation and associated offshore processing of sea-bed mineral resources’.110 
Furthermore, Regulation 21 under the Annex I sets requirements for ‘drilling rigs and other 
platforms’. The requirements refer to operational discharges, oil filtering equipment, and oil 
discharge monitoring. However, the Regulation is of limited applicability to oil spills as only 
                                                 
105 Ibid., preamble. 
106 OSPAR 10/23/10-E available at https://www.ospar.org/convention/agreements/page5; accessed 29 June 
2018. 
107 Ibid., Art.  3. By ‘extreme’ the Recommendation means conditions including depth, pressure, and weather, 
Art.  1. 
108 MARPOL (n 62) Art.  2(4). 
109 In January 2017, the Polar Code, the first binding international instrument for regulation of shipping in the 
polar waters, entered into force. It is implemented through the amendments to three IMO Conventions, 
including the MARPOL. Although it is instrumental in imposing stricter standards on ships operating in the 
Arctic, it does not regulate incidental pollution from offshore petroleum installations. Available at 
http://www.imo.org/en/MediaCentre/HotTopics/polar/Pages/default.aspx; 29 June 2018. 
110 Ibid., Art.  2(3)(b)(ii). 
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‘the discharge of machinery space drainage and contaminated ballast’ are subject to 
MARPOL.111 It, therefore, does not cover incidental pollution. Such omissions in the scope 
of the application are understandable given the IMO mandate as the specialised UN agency 
responsible for ‘safety and security of shipping and prevention of marine pollution by 
ships’.112  
Thus, both the OSPAR and the MARPOL, although of great significance to the protection of 
the marine environment in general, are of limited application for the purposes of upstream 
petroleum oil spill prevention and response in the Arctic. 
 
 LOSC  
Part XII of the LOSC sets out a general framework for the ‘Protection and Preservation of the 
Marine Environment’. It reaffirms States’ sovereign rights to exploit their natural resources 
‘in accordance with their duty to protect and preserve the marine environment’.113 It further 
confirms the obligation for the States to take measures to minimise pollution, including that 
from offshore petroleum installations.114 Part XII further calls for global and regional 
                                                 
111 MARPOL, Unified Interpretations of Annex I available at 
http://www.marpoltraining.com/MMSKOREAN/MARPOL/Annex_I/ui1.htm#56; accessed 29 June 2018, 56.1-
2. 
112 Some argue that the IMO should focus its work on safety, pollution prevention and liability, including 
offshore petroleum development. See e.g., JA Roach, ‘International Standards for Offshore Drilling’ in MH 
Nordquist, J Norton Moore, AE Chircop, and RJ Long (eds), The Regulation of Continental Shelf Development: 
Rethinking International Standards (Brill Nijhoff, Leiden, 2013) 105-150, at p.116. 
113 LOSC Art.  193. 
114 Ibid., Art.  194(3)(c). 
27 
 
cooperation ‘in formulating and elaborating international rules, standards and recommended 
practices (…) for the protection and preservation of the marine environment, taking into 
account characteristic regional features’.115 The national laws and regulations for regulating 
petroleum extraction activities ‘shall be no less effective than international rules, standards 
and recommended practices and procedures’.116 The LOSC further prescribes that States 
‘acting especially through competent international organizations (…) shall establish global or 
regional rules, standards and recommended practices and procedures to prevent, reduce and 
control pollution of the marine environment’.117 The reliance on such external norms for the 
purposes of environmental protection, although ensuring the relevance of the regulation, 
might also lead to ambiguity on what standards are indeed generally accepted, 118 particularly 
in the Arctic regional context. Whereas such standards exist for a number of activities 
potentially harmful to the marine environment, as discussed above and by other scholars,119 
upstream petroleum activities are not globally regulated in a comprehensive way. If one were 
to accept the Arctic Council as a ‘competent international organization’ and its documents on 
the regulation of upstream petroleum development as the relevant regional rules, standards, 
and recommended practices for the purposes of the LOSC interpretation, the Council’s 
contributions might become vital for filling the lacunae in international regulation. The 
relevant non-binding guidelines and recommendations produced by the Arctic Council are 
analysed in the fourth section. 
                                                 
115 Ibid., Art.  197. 
116 Ibid., Art.  208(3). 
117 Ibid., Art.  208(5). 
118 Redgwell (n 15) at p. 607. 




Response over prevention? The effectiveness of treaties in regulating oil spills in the Arctic 
waters  
Given the overview of the treaties related to oil spill prevention, preparedness and response in 
the Arctic, it is clear there are gaps in the legal regime relating to oil spill prevention 
preparedness and response in the Arctic waters. Two of the most obvious gaps are in the 
international regulation of the oil spill prevention and the lack of international rules for 
addressing Arctic-specific response challenges. Table 1 below briefly summarises the scope 
of each treaty in advance of a more detailed discussion below. 
Table 1: Treaty regulation of Arctic oil spill prevention, preparedness, and response 
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As demonstrated, all of the examined treaties are either concerned with operational 
discharges or the preparedness and response. Although these are significant for the protection 
of the Arctic marine environment, they are not sufficient to improve safety at the offshore 
petroleum installations and ensure the prevention of a large-scale oil spill. The lack of 
common prevention and well control standards thus constitutes a clear gap in the treaty-based 
regulation of the Arctic offshore petroleum development.  
Furthermore, although treaties address preparedness and response in general, they do not 
sufficiently address Arctic-specific challenges outlined in the second section above. The most 
glaring gaps are the lack of consideration of Arctic-specific oil clean-up techniques and 
development of spill response infrastructure along the Arctic coasts.  
The OPRC is not an Arctic-specific treaty, but the MOSPA is. However, it largely repeats the 
obligations already in place in the OPRC. More importantly, it does not address Arctic-
specific issues associated with preparedness and response. Some drawbacks of the MOSPA 
have been pointed out in this regard. First, it does not address the lack of adequate 
investments in the infrastructure.120 There is no pan-Arctic obligation on the minimum 
                                                 
120 SV Rottem, ‘The Arctic Council in Arctic Governance: The Significance of the Oil Spill Agreement’ in L 
Jakobson and N Melvin (eds), The New Arctic Governance (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2016) 147-174, at 
p. 163; E Tedsen and S Cavalieri, ‘EU–US Cooperation to Enhance Arctic Marine Governance’ in E Tedsen, S 
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standards for response capacity and equipment and no mention of specially trained personnel. 
Second, it is not clear which cooperation frameworks are prioritised: the MOSPA or those 
under the bilateral agreements. Rottem argues that the Agreement could be of ‘secondary 
importance’121 in the presence of other cooperation mechanisms, such as the bilateral treaty 
between Norway and Russia.  
The response plans for Arctic offshore oil development, although present in every jurisdiction 
in compliance with the OPRC and the MOSPA, have been heavily criticised by 
environmental NGOs. For example, Greenpeace found the oil spill response for the 
Prirazlomnaya platform in the Russian Pechora Sea inconsistent with the relevant Russian 
legislation.122 Shell’s Oil Spill Response Plan for the Chukchi Sea123 has been approved by 
the regulator, but was met with criticism from the environmental NGOs for making 
                                                                                                                                                        
Cavalieri and RA Kraemer (eds), Arctic Marine Governance (Springer, Berlin/Heidelberg, 2014) 237-262, at p. 
255. 
121 Rottem (n 120) at pp. 165–166. 
122 Greenpeace, ‘Gaps in the Oil Spill Prevention and Response Plan for the Operational Area of the 
Prirazlomnaya Offshore Ice-Resistant Stationary Platform of Gazprom Neft Shelf’ (2014) available at 
http://www.greenpeace.org/russia/Global/russia/report/Arctic-
oil/Gazprom/Gaps_OSR_Prirazlomnaya_English.pdf; accessed 29 June 2018. Among the inconsistencies are the 
failure to fulfil the requirement to have financial guarantees for conducting response measures and incorrect 
effectiveness evaluation of clean-up techniques in ice-covered waters. The executive summary of the plan is 
available at http://shelf-neft.gazprom.ru/d/textpage/4f/79/referat-po-planu-lrn-2013.pdf [in Russian]; accessed 
29 June 2018. 
123 Shell, ‘Chukchi Sea Regional Exploration Programme Oil Spill Response Plan’ (2011) available a 
https://www.bsee.gov/sites/bsee.gov/files/oil-spill-response-plan-osrp/bsee/shell-chukchi-sea-osrp-february-
2012.pdf; accessed 29 June 2018. 
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unrealistic assumptions regarding the success rates of mechanical recovery.124 These 
concerns were reiterated by Shell’s failures during the 2012 drilling season when the 
containment dome failed and was crushed during testing,125 and when the drilling rig Kulluk 
ran aground in the storm leaving the crew to be rescued by the Coast Guard.126 
Treaties, as expected under international law, create obligations for States, rarely engaging 
with important non-State actors, such as the relevant industry bodies, national governance 
agencies (such as offshore petroleum agencies and coast guards), indigenous peoples 
organisations. 
Under the Arctic Council framework, the oil spill response regulation has been actively 
promoted through the work of the EPPR, joint exercises, and the development of technical 
reports.127 Should the Council’s non-binding documents constitute generally accepted 
international rules and standards (GAIRs) under the LOSC framework, they could assist in 
                                                 
124 Oceana, ‘Frozen Future: Shell’s Ongoing Gamble in the US Arctic’ (2014) at p. 29, available at 
https://oceana.org/reports/frozen-future-shell%E2%80%99s-ongoing-gamble-us-arctic; accessed 6 November 
2018. 
125 ‘Review of Shell’s 2012 Alaska Offshore Oil and Gas Exploration Program [Report to the Secretary of 
Interior]’ (DOI 2013) at p. 19, available at https://www.bsee.gov/sites/bsee.gov/files/notification-of-incidents-
of-non-compliance-incs/notices-to-lessees/shell-report-3-8-13-final.pdf; accessed 6 November 2018. 
126 The Coast Guard report examining the accident quotes ‘significant number and nature of the potential 
violations of law and regulations’ US Coast Guard, ‘Report on Investigation in the Circumstances Surrounding 
the Multiple Related Marine Casualties and the Grounding of the MODU Kulluk’ (2014) at p. 1, available at 
https://usa.oceana.org/report-investigation-circumstances-surrounding-multiple-related-marine-casualties-and-
grounding-modu; accessed 6 November 2018.; M Funk, ‘The Wreck of the Kulluk’ The New York Times (30 
December 2014). 
127 See http://www.eppr.org/ accessed 25 June 2018. 
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bridging the gaps in international regulation of oil spill prevention and response in the Arctic. 
The section below analyses the Council’s work on oil spill prevention and response in the 
context of offshore petroleum development. 
 
Soft law as an instrument to fill in the regulatory gap in the international governance of 
oil spills in the Arctic  
As established above, treaty regulation of oil spills in the Arctic leaves significant gaps in oil 
spill prevention and region-specific response challenges.  The non-binding guidelines and 
standards play an important role in the protection of the marine environment from the 
negative effects of offshore petroleum activities.128 The Arctic Council has been active in 
research and cooperation in prevention of, preparedness for and response to oil spills in the 
Arctic. Despite its inability to take binding decisions, it has initiated research and 
cooperation, and produced some normative outputs, such as the Arctic Offshore Oil and Gas 
Guidelines.129 This section examines these outputs and focuses on the ways in which the 
Council’s activities might be instrumental in supplementing the relevant treaty regulation. 
 
                                                 
128 Liu (n 14) at p. 197; Redgwell (n 15). 
129 Arctic Council, Arctic Offshore Oil and Gas Guidelines (2009) (AOOGG), available at 
https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/handle/11374/63; accessed 6 November 2018. 
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Arctic Offshore Oil and Gas Guidelines (AOOGG)130 
The Working Group of the Arctic Council on the Protection of the Arctic Marine 
Environment (PAME) released the latest version of the AOOGG in 2009. They are not 
binding but are intended to guide the national authorities and the industry by encouraging 
them to apply the ‘highest standards currently available’131 and cover all stages of offshore oil 
and gas activities, apart from transportation.132  
The Guidelines address oil spill prevention, preparedness and response and could be 
complementary to the existing treaties. Thus, section 6 of the Guidelines engages with well 
control requirements and refers to the Arctic conditions. It requires that the ‘BOP and related 
equipment should be suitable for operation in subfreezing conditions’.133 It further stipulates 
that the drilling fluids, well casing programmes, cement, emergency well shut-in procedures, 
and well safety programmes should be ‘suited to Arctic conditions including moving ice and 
possible subsurface permafrost’.134 Finally, the Guidelines require that well-control exercises 
‘be conducted regularly for each crew to develop response proficiency to conditions 
threatening a blowout’.135 These requirements are implemented in the US and Greenland.136 
                                                 
130 Ibid. 2009 is the latest version. The first Guidelines were adopted in 1997 and updated in 2002. 
131 Ibid., sec. 1.2. 
132 For transportation, the Guidelines refer to the AMAP, ‘Assessment 2007: Oil and Gas Activities in the Arctic 
- Effects and Potential Effects (vol 2)’ (2010), available at https://www.amap.no/documents/doc/assessment-
2007-oil-and-gas-activities-in-the-arctic-effects-and-potential-effects.-volume-2/100; accessed 6 November 
2018. 





Canada, Russia, and Norway require adapting the requirements to Arctic conditions to a 
varying extent. 137  
Emergency preparedness and response are addressed in section 7 of the Guidelines, which 
offers some Arctic-specific provisions, absent from both the OPRC and the MOSPA. First, 
the Guidelines require an ice-management plan in addition to the usual emergency response 
documents. The contingency and oil spill response plans are expected to evaluate the 
environmental effects of the response operation under varying weather and ice conditions, 
which means identifying alternative clean-up techniques where appropriate.138 These 
requirements are implemented in some Arctic States, albeit inconsistently.139 
                                                                                                                                                        
136 The US: CFR §250.418(f); 30 CFR §250.428(i). Greenland: Exploration Drilling Guidelines 2010, available 
at 
https://www.govmin.gl/images/stories/petroleum/bmp_Exploration_Drilling_Guidelines_March%20_2010.pdf; 
accessed 6 November 2018. 
137 Canada: the operators must demonstrate how Arctic environment would affect the design of the rig and the 
well. ‘Filing Requirements for Offshore Drilling in the Canadian Arctic’ (National Energy Board 2014) at p. 2–
6. Norway: ‘Norway Guidelines Regarding the Facilities Regulations’ sec 48. Russia: the Arctic-specific 
standards for materials used in offshore petroleum exploration and production are reportedly currently under 
development. M Kichanov, ‘Siberian Innovations Will Be Tested in the Arctic [in Russian]’ Kommersant (28 
June 2016). 
138 AOOGG (n 129) sec. 7.2. 
139 Canada: Requirement of identification of spill containment in ice and ice-infested waters. ‘Filing 
Requirements’ (n 137) sec 4.18. Greenland: requirement of Ice Management Plans prior to drilling 
authorisation. ‘Drilling Guidelines’ (n 46). Norway: case-by-case approach to the oil spill response plan based 
on the specificities of a particular field. The plan for Gøliat reportedly considers the specific conditions of the 
Barents Sea, such as strong winds and waves, low temperatures, and reduced visibility. Recommendation from 
the Ministry of Petroleum and Energy, Proposition no 64 (2008-2009) ‘The Development and Operation of 
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 Finally, the emergency response plan is expected to contain information on ‘precautionary 
measures to secure the well’ in the case of an emergency and on relief well arrangements, 
with the demonstration of the availability of necessary equipment and support systems.140 At 
present the relief well requirement is implemented in some Arctic States.141 
Thus, the Guidelines address prevention to some extent, and engage with preparedness and 
response. They address well control through the requirement of the capacity to drill a relief 
well and set minimum content requirements for emergency response plans. In setting content 
requirements, the Guidelines take into account specific Arctic conditions such as harsh 
weather, low temperatures, presence of ice, and possible issues with mobilising response 
equipment quickly due to lack of roads, airports and ports. 
The AOOGG is the most comprehensive soft law document on offshore petroleum in the 
Arctic.  However, neither the Arctic Council nor the PAME conducted a comprehensive 
follow-up on their implementation. Some commentators are sceptical about the overall 
effectiveness of the AOOGG. Thus, Byers asserts that the Guidelines fell short in that they 
are non-binding and avoided ‘some of the more difficult’ issues.142 Koivurova, Kankaanpaää, 
                                                                                                                                                        
Gøliat’ [in Norwegian] available at https://www.regjeringen.no/no/dokumenter/stprp-nr-64-2008-2009-
/id560066/sec3#KAP3-3; accessed 25 May 2018, sec 3.3.3. US: plan must describe the ‘ice intervention 
practices’ meant to improve the effectiveness of the oil spill response options and strategies listed in the oil spill 
response plan ‘in the presence of sea ice’. 30 CFR §254.23(g)(2).  
140 AOOGG (n 129) sec 7.2. 
141 Canada: National Energy Board, ‘The Past Is Always Present: Review of Offshore Drilling in the Canadian 
Arctic’ (2011) (n 44) at p. 39. Greenland: ‘Drilling Guidelines’ (n 46). Norway: ‘NORSOK Standard D-010 (n 
45) sec 4.8.2. US: 30 CFR §250.471. 
142 Byers (n 16) at p. 212. 
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and Stępień criticise the lack of ‘regular evaluations procedure’.143  Independent studies 
considered the implementation in Canada and the US144 and in Greenland and Russia.145 
Further, more recent 2016 US Arctic Drilling rule acknowledges addressing 
recommendations contained in the Guidelines146 and Greenland ‘expressly models its 
guidelines on environmental impact assessment on the AOOGG’.147 In addition, scholars 
highlight148 the important role of the Guidelines as the basis for new initiatives, such as the 
2014 Guidelines Systems Safety Management and Safety Culture149 and the web-based 
information-sharing portal on the regulation of offshore petroleum in the Arctic States.150 
    
                                                 
143 T Koivurova, P Kankaanpää and A Stępień, ‘Innovative Environmental Protection: Lessons from the Arctic’ 
(2015) 27 Journal of Environmental Law 285-311, at p. 297. 
144 ‘Operating Practices in the United States and Canada’ (Vermont Law School Institute for Energy and the 
Environment 2010) at p. 1, available at http://www-
assets.vermontlaw.edu/Assets/iee/Baker_ArcticOffshoreOil1.pdf; accessed 6 November 2018. 
145 ‘The Arctic Offshore Oil and Gas Guidelines in Greenland and the Russian Federation’ (Vermont Law 
School Institute for Energy and the Environment 2011) White Paper 5, available at http://www-
assets.vermontlaw.edu/Assets/iee/Baker_ArcticOffshoreOil5.pdf; accessed 6 November 2018. 
146 Arctic OCS Drilling Rule (n 70). 
147 B Baker, ‘The Arctic Offshore Hydrocarbon Hiatus of 2015: An Opportunity to Revisit Regulation Around 
the Pole’ in Pelaudeix and Basse (n 8) 148-166, at p. 152. 
148 Ibid., at pp. 152–3. 
149 PAME (n 33). 
150 PAME, available at https://www.pame.is/index.php/projects/resource-exploration-and-development/mre; 
accessed 25 June 2018. 
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AOOGG Systems Safety Management and Safety Culture151 
In 2014, the PAME issued a new guidance document ‘to enhance and supplement’152 the 
AOOGG. The Safety Management and Culture Guidelines (SMCG) deal with systems or 
process safety rather than occupational health and safety.153 The SMCG make 
recommendations for the regulators to ‘define and communicate expectations regarding 
positive safety culture’, and to require operators to ‘establish, implement, and improve their 
safety culture’.154 They further identify challenges and recommended approaches for 
improving safety management. Although the SMCG represent an important compilation of 
‘lessons learned’ from the past offshore petroleum incidents and the current safety 
requirements of the Arctic States, they are written in a report form and contain few norms 
that could be directly implemented by the Arctic States. Rather, they propose 
recommendations for operators and regulators. Nevertheless, the SMCG address the issues 
that have been identified as catalysts to the previous offshore well blowouts.155 
 
                                                 
151 PAME 33). 
152 Ibid., at p. 1. 
153 Ibid., at p. 2. 
154 Ibid., at pp. 19–21. 
155 National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon (n 34) at pp. 223–224; ‘Report of the Montara 
Commission of Inquiry’ (n 34) at pp. 343–350. 
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The Task Force on Oil Pollution Prevention (TFOPP) Framework Plan156 
The TFOPP was established ‘to develop an Arctic Council action plan or other arrangement 
on oil pollution prevention’.157 Participants included all of the Arctic States, two Permanent 
Participants, nine Observer States, the European Union (EU), and a number of Observer 
NGOs.158  
It was not clear from the outset whether the Plan would be binding or not. The ultimate 
choice of the non-binding form was explained by ‘the limited time remaining to deliver the 
Plan within the envisaged timetable’.159 The document was adopted  
to strengthen cooperation, including exchange of information, among the [Arctic States] in the field of 
prevention of marine oil pollution in order to protect the Arctic marine environment.
160
  
The majority of the Plan’s provisions relate to ‘sharing lessons learned and best practices’ 
and ‘exchange of data’.161 The Plan recommends the promotion of ‘cooperation between 
                                                 
156 TFOPP, ‘The Arctic Council Framework Plan for Cooperation on Prevention of Oil Pollution from 
Petroleum and Maritime Activities in the Marine Areas of the Arctic 2015 (Prevention Framework Plan)’, 
available at https://oaarchive.arctic-
council.org/bitstream/handle/11374/609/ACMMCA09_Iqaluit_2015_SAO_Report_Annex_3_TFOPP_Framew
ork_Plan.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y; accessed 6 November 2018. 
157 Kiruna Declaration on the Occasion of the 8th Meeting of the Arctic Council (15 May 2013) at p. 4, available 
at https://www.arctic-council.org/index.php/en/document-archive/category/425-main-documents-from-kiruna-
ministerial-meeting; accessed 6 November 2018. 
158 ‘Senior Arctic Officials’ Report to Ministers (Iqaluit, 24 April 2015)’ at p. 4, available at 
https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/handle/11374/494; accessed 6 November 2018. 
159 TFOPP, Meeting September 2014; summary of the meeting available at https://oaarchive.arctic-
council.org/handle/11374/817; accessed 29 June 2018.  
160 Prevention Framework Plan (n 156) sec. 1.1. 
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competent national authorities on issues concerning the prevention of Arctic marine oil 
pollution from petroleum activities’.162  
The Plan requires the completion of ‘an overview of the existing and potential technical and 
operational safety measures specifically designed to prevent oil pollution in the Arctic marine 
environment from offshore petroleum activity’.163 In response to this requirement, the EPPR 
published a report on technical and operational measures specifically designed to prevent oil 
spills in the Arctic waters.164 The Plan’s further requirement to promote the development of 
prevention standards/best practices and to assess the sufficiency of the existing ones was 
implemented through the publication of the relevant report.165  
Some of the Plan’s provisions relate more to the preparedness rather than prevention. Thus, 
section 3.2.4 stipulates that the Arctic States develop a catalogue of existing resources to 
minimise the environmental impact of a spill, and to assess the adequacy of such resources.166  
The majority of the Plan’s provisions relate to the exchange of information and data. To 
facilitate the implementation of the Plan, the Arctic Offshore Regulators Forum has been 
established in 2016.167 The Forum brings together the offshore petroleum safety regulators 
                                                                                                                                                        
161 E.g., ibid., secs. 3.1.1; 3.2.1; 3.2.2; 3.1.2; 3.2.5; 3.2.6. 
162 Ibid., sec. 2.1. 
163 Ibid. 
164 EPPR (n 28).  
165 EPPR, ‘Standardization as a Tool for Prevention of Oil Spills in the Arctic’ (2017), available at 
https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/handle/11374/1951; accessed 6 November 2018.  
166 Prevention Framework Plan (n 156) sec. 3.2.4. 
167 ‘Arctic Offshore Regulators Forum: Terms of Reference (SAO Meeting of the Arctic Council, March 2016)’ 
sec. 1(a), available at https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/handle/11374/1729; accessed 6 November 2018. 
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across the Arctic States and holds meetings twice a year to ‘exchange information, best 
practices and relevant experiences learned from regulatory efforts’. The Arctic Council has 
followed up on the Framework Plan by assessing the progress of the implementation.168 This 
is a novel initiative in the Arctic Council, which was criticised before for not following up on 
the status of implementation of its recommendations.169 
 
Complementary nature of the Arctic Council soft  law documents  
The Arctic Council has consistently worked on oil spill prevention and response since its 
establishment. In terms of scope, its outputs are wider than the treaties’. Thus, unlike treaties, 
they address oil spill prevention measures, well control, and Arctic-specific responses. Table 
2 below summarises the scope of each document. 
 
Table 2: Arctic Council regulation of oil spill prevention, preparedness, and response 
Factors AOOGG SMCG TFOPP Plan 
Operational scope All stages of petroleum 
development, except 
transportation 
Systems or process safety for 
oil and gas development 
Oil pollution in general 
Prevention and well 
control 
Yes, requirements for materials to 
be suitable for Arctic conditions; 
Yes, but only safety 
management systems 
Yes, but only sharing and 
compilation of knowledge 
                                                 
168 EPPR, Arctic Council Status on Implementation of the ‘Framework Plan for Cooperation on Prevention of 
Oil Pollution from Petroleum and Maritime Activities in the Marine Areas of the Arctic’ (2017) available at 
https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/bitstream/handle/11374/1938/2017-05-05-EPPR-
Report_Implementation_Framework_Plan_OPP-Edocs-3742.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y; accessed 29 June 
2018. 
169 Koivurova et al., (n 143) at p. 97; MA Dubois and C Tesar, ‘Making It Stick – A New Approach to 
Implementing Arctic Council Decisions and Recommendations’ [2014] Arctic Yearbook, available at 
https://arcticyearbook.com/arctic-yearbook/2014; accessed 6 November 2018 
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contractors management. regarding prevention 
Preparedness Yes, risk analysis, emergency 
planning; requirement for 
operators to demonstrate financial 
capacity to respond 
Yes, limited consideration of 
risk assessment 
Yes, limited consideration of 
risk assessment 
Oil spill response plan Yes, minimum content 
requirements to include response 
in Arctic conditions 
Yes, to a limited extent, no 
requirements 
No 
Well response plan Yes, relief well No No 
Response techniques Yes, to a limited extent No No 
Arctic-specific 
requirements 
Yes Yes Yes 
 
As demonstrated, the scope of the non-binding documents is wider, particularly where oil 
spill prevention measures and the Arctic regional specificities are concerned. This comes 
with some trade-offs. The provisions of the non-binding documents are largely not 
formulated as international legal rules. Rather than placing obligations directly on the Arctic 
States, the Council’s documents typically establish the review of best practices and make 
recommendations not just to the relevant regulatory bodies, but also to the industry and other 
relevant stakeholders. Indeed, an important advantage of the Arctic Council outputs on oil 
spill prevention and response is the way it involves the relevant non-State actors: national and 
regional government agencies and industry stakeholders. Such direct involvement might 
extend the legitimacy of the documents and enhance institutional collaboration. It has further 
been positively regarded by scholars in the context of ‘hybrid governance.’170  
Despite the lack of direct rules and the non-binding nature, as noted above, some national 
documents directly refer to the Guidelines, which signals the implementation not just through 
increased cooperation and information sharing, but through the legislative outputs at the 
national level as well. 
                                                 
170 The authors, however, warn of potential fragmentation of implementation leading to the lack of ‘coherent 
regional governance’. Osofsky et al., (n 17) at p. 418. 
42 
 
Further non-treaty regulatory instruments can be prominent in improving the offshore oil and 
gas safety in the Arctic. The use of industry standards across the Arctic region, although 
falling outside the scope of the treaty regulation, could become a source of generally accepted 
rules and practices. Thus, the Norwegian petroleum industry standards for well control, 
NORSOK D-010,171 are specifically referenced in the Canadian Filing Requirements for 
drilling in the Arctic waters.172 Another example is the bilateral project between Norway and 
Russia, Barents 2020, which was established to create a coordinated approach to petroleum 
development in the Barents Sea.173 With direct involvement of the industry,174 the Barents 
2020 Reports identified and recommended common standards with the view of inter alia 
coherent approaches to risk assessment of major hazards, including blow-outs on offshore 
drilling, production and storage units.175  
The Arctic Council governance does not come in lieu of treaty regulation, but in addition to 
it. The complementary nature of such soft law approach is evident in a number of ways. First, 
the additional value of the MOSPA, compared to the OPRC, stems from the cooperation it 
encouraged in recommending common practices, conducting exercises and using the regular 
Council meetings as a discussion forum. Second, the Arctic Council recommendations and 
                                                 
171 ‘Filing Requirements’ (n 137) at p. 5–8. 
172 ‘NORSOK Standard D-010’ (n 45). 
173 ‘Barents 2020: A Tool for a Forward-Looking High North Policy’ (2006) at p. 3 available at 
https://www.regjeringen.no/globalassets/upload/ud/vedlegg/barents2020e.pdf; accessed 29 June 2018. 
174 DNV acted as the project manager; Gazprom, Lukoil and Statoil, among others, were on the steering 
committee. DNV, ‘Barents 2020: Assessment of International Standards for Safe Exploration, Production and 
Transportation of Oil and Gas in the Barents Sea (Phase 4)’ (2012) at p. 13, available at 
https://www.dnvgl.com/oilgas/arctic/barents-2020-reports.html; accessed 6 November 2018. 
175 Ibid., at pp. 18–23. 
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the industry standards were found to be included in at least some of the relevant national 
legislation. Finally, the LOSC already envisages the incorporation of the generally accepted 
international rules and standards,176 and the norms developed under the Council’s auspices 
could potentially qualify as such. 
 
Conclusions 
The importance of a robust regulatory framework for offshore safety in the Arctic is hard to 
overestimate. However, the issues of international regulation of oil spill prevention and 
response measures are not inherent to the Arctic region. Both prevention and response 
measures for oil spills from shipping are regulated under the global IMO agenda, whereas for 
spills from blowouts, it is only the response measures that fall under the scope of treaty 
regulation. With the exception of a few regional agreements, the prevention of oil spills from 
petroleum development remains largely unregulated by treaties. The growing role of soft law 
governance warrants additional research, especially where the norms and standards are 
constantly evolving and require the involvement of a number of non-State stakeholders. In 
the Arctic, the Arctic Council and its working groups, have now fully asserted its position as 
the regional governance and knowledge centre on oil spill prevention and response.  
                                                 
176 See third section. 
